The Supreme Court Law
Review: Osgoode’s Annual
Constitutional Cases
Conference
Volume 81 (2019)

Article 4

Daniels v. Canada: Reflections on Constitutional
Technique
S. Ronald Stevenson
Federal Department of Justice

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr
Part of the Law Commons

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works
4.0 License.
Citation Information
Stevenson, S. Ronald. "Daniels v. Canada: Reflections on Constitutional Technique." The Supreme Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual
Constitutional Cases Conference 81. (2019).
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr/vol81/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Supreme
Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.

Daniels v. Canada: Reflections on
Constitutional Technique
S. Ronald Stevenson*

The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Daniels v. Canada
(Indian Affairs and Northern Development),1 has resolved a longstanding dispute about the scope of section 91(24) of the Constitution
Act, 1867.2 We now know with certainty that both Métis and non-status
Indians fall within the constitutional category of “Indians” that is
contained in this provision. However, many questions remain about the
interpretation and impact of section 91(24). This article will only attempt
to address a small sub-set of these questions, focusing primarily on
methods of constitutional interpretation. This argument begins by noting
that the Supreme Court of Canada in Daniels seems to be using both
originalist and progressive techniques of constitutional interpretation.
I describe and evaluate the specific evidence raised to support the
originalist side of the argument, that is, the claim that the word “Indians”
in section 91(24) was always understood as including the Métis. I argue
that much of this evidence is not particularly strong, and that some of the
arguments developed based on this evidence risk bringing racist and
assimilationist beliefs and policies of the time into our contemporary
constitutional practice. I then turn to the arguments Abella J. makes for a
progressive interpretation of section 91(24) which are much stronger in
my view. I conclude by suggesting a variety of ways by which future
constitutional interpretation in this field might draw from the stronger
progressive side of the Daniels decision, while considering ways to avoid
the potential pitfalls of reifying 19th century racial distinctions. Such an

*
S. Ronald Stevenson, B.A., M.Phil. (Oxon.), LL.B., LL.M., LL.D. This article was
prepared in the Author’s personal capacity and cannot be attributed to his employer, the federal
Department of Justice, in any way. Thank you to Sonia Lawrence and two anonymous reviewers for
very helpful suggestions, but any mistakes are, of course, the Author’s.
1
[2016] S.C.J. No. 12, 2016 SCC 12 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Daniels”].
2
(U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 [hereinafter “Constitution Act, 1867”].
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approach might provide a stronger foundation for future efforts to
achieve reconciliation.
One of the dominant questions in Canadian constitutional law has been
how the words of the Constitution are understood over time. While there
are areas where the “intent of the framers”, the original understanding of
key terms and the historical practice at key moments are very important,3
the dominant metaphor for understanding the task of constitutional
interpretation has been the “living tree”.4 The latter has also been described
as progressive interpretation.5 The Daniels decision stands out as an
example where both originalist and progressive approaches to
interpretation were deployed. The decision can be most fairly read as
concluding that section 91(24) was always broad enough to support valid
legislation dealing with Métis and non-status Indians and that modern
developments, especially the explicit inclusion of the Métis in the 1982
package of amendments, reinforced this broad interpretation. However, it
must be noted that an element of imprecision is added by using both
techniques of constitutional interpretation simultaneously as they tend to
pull in different directions. An originalist argument is deployed to suggest
an element of constraint at the time of enactment while a progressive
argument tends to focus on the capacity of key constitutional terms to
change over time. While the historical aspect of the Daniels decision is
open to some critical scrutiny, the conclusion as to the impact of the 1982
amendments arguably provides a firmer foundation for a broad
interpretation of Parliament’s legislative authority under section 91(24).
Justice Abella turned to several sources of evidence to support the
conclusion that the term “Indians” was always understood to include the
Métis prior to and after the enactment of section 91(24) and that this view
can be reasonably ascribed to the framers of the Constitution. There is no
direct evidence about deliberations or debates in the development of the
Constitution Act, 1867 on the use of the word “Indians” so a wide range of
indirect evidence is considered. The problem that this article identifies is that
none of this evidence really engages directly with the argument that was
presented to the Court in favour of an interpretation of section 91(24) that
3
J.G. Morley, “Dead Hands, Living Trees, Historic Compromises: The Senate Reform and
Supreme Court References Bring the Originalism Debate to Canada” (2016) 53 Osgoode Hall L.J.
745-798; B. Oliphant and L. Sirota, “Has the Supreme Court of Canada Rejected ‘Originalism’?”
(2016) 42:1 Queen’s L.J. 107-164; L. Sirota and B. Oliphant, “Originalist Reasoning in Canadian
Constitutional Jurisprudence” (2017) 50 UBC L. Rev. 505-574.
4
The Honourable Justice R.J. Sharpe, “The Persons case and the Living Tree Theory of
Constitutional Interpretation” (2013) 64 U.N.B.L.J. 1-18.
5
I. Binnie, “Constitutional Interpretation and Original Intent” (2004) S.C.L.R. (2d) 345.
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excludes the Métis. This argument can be summarized in three propositions.
First, a clear distinction was made between Indians and the Métis at the time
that section 91(24) was enacted, including by the Indigenous groups
themselves. Second, this core distinction is not negated by the occasional
inclusion of Métis individuals in federal programs or legislation, rather it is a
standard application of the ancillary and aspect doctrines of Canadian
constitutional law. Third, the jurisprudence up to Daniels had been largely
consistent with the distinction between Métis and Indians as separate
collectives.6 The purpose of this article is not to suggest that a lengthy debate
be reopened as it is the role of the courts to bring such debate to a close.7
However, close attention to constitutional reasoning might liberate
possibilities for future constitutional interpretation.
With this intention in mind, three preliminary points can be made
about the approach of the Court to historical evidence in Daniels. First,
the evidence tends to consider evidence of treatment of Métis individuals
rather than collectives. Second, a model starts to emerge of section 91(24)
as conferring authority to deal with a relatively undifferentiated class of
individuals rather than as a provision enabling legislation with respect to
Indigenous collectives. Third, the methodology differs greatly from that
normally deployed in a division of powers case. The net effect of these
three points is that the task of interpretation is cast as finding the outer
6
Limitations of space preclude assessing the treatment of key precedents considered in the
Daniels judgment. Suffice to say that there is a strand of interpretation that has consistently focussed
on the historical distinction between Indians and Métis. The two key cases are R. v. Blais, [2003]
S.C.J. No. 44, 2003 SCC 44 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Blais”] and Reference re: British North America
Act, 1867 (U.K.), s. 91 (sub nom. Re Eskimo), [1939] S.C.J. No. 5, [1939] S.C.R. 104 (S.C.C.)
(Reference as to whether “Indians” in s. 91(24) of the B.N.A. Act includes Eskimo inhabitants of the
Province of Quebec). In Blais, the conclusion that the Métis did not fall under the term “Indian”
within the meaning of paragraph 13 of the Natural Resources Transfer Agreement (Manitoba),
Schedule to the Constitutional Act, 1930 (U.K.), 20-21 Geo. V, c. 26 [hereinafter “Natural
Resources Transfer Agreement”], turns in part on the different treatment of the Inuit and the Métis in
the Hudson’s Bay Company census that was the primary historical source for the inclusion of the
Inuit within the category of Indians. The Hudson’s Bay Company included the Inuit and the Indians
within the same category in this census. In contrast, the Supreme Court of Canada concluded in Blais
that the same report contrasted “Whites and half-breeds” from those who were identifiable as
Indians. This evidence is not considered in the Supreme Court of Canada in Daniels, supra, note 1.
Blais itself is distinguished on the basis that the Natural Resources Transfer Agreement is a
constitutional agreement and not part of the Constitution. However, this is a strange conclusion in
light of the inclusion of the Agreement in the Schedule of the Constitution Act, 1930 setting out the
documents that are part of the Constitution Act, 1982, supra, note 2, Schedule B under section 52.
This conclusion is also difficult to square with the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v.
Horseman, [1990] S.C.J. No. 39, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 901 (S.C.C.), where the constitutional status of the
Natural Resources Transfer Agreement, including its ability to modify the division of powers,
provides a key reason for the conclusion reached by the Court about the scope of paragraph 13.
7
R. v. Marshall, [1999] S.C.J. No. 55, 1999 3 S.C.R. 456 at para. 37 (S.C.C.).
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boundaries of a class of individuals who might be described as “91(24)
Indians” rather than asking what kinds of laws might be passed under
Parliament’s exclusive authority under section 91(24). All three levels of
court shifted the focus away from the legality of the criteria used by
Parliament (genealogy, self-identification, group acceptance, cultural
practice etc.) in favour of thinking about section 91(24) as covering a
shifting group of individuals who identify as Indigenous.

I. “ORIGINALIST” ARGUMENTS FROM EVIDENCE
Eight different categories of evidence were considered by Abella J. in
supporting the conclusion that Métis were historically considered to be
Indians within the meaning of the Constitution. These include: the
prevailing views of academics;8 a quote from the author Thomas King;9 the
inclusion of Métis under an 1868 statute;10 the inclusion of Métis in “many”
post-Confederation statutes;11 the consistency of inclusion of the Métis with
the fundamental goals of Confederation;12 the inclusion of Métis in the
residential schools program;13 the participation of Métis in pre- and postConfederation treaties;14 and the opinions expressed in an internal federal
discussion paper prepared in 1980 in preparation for constitutional
discussions.15 It will not be possible to assess the treatment of all the
evidence but enough will be addressed to make the point that the inclusion
of the Métis as a collective within section 91(24) is not strongly supported.
8
The key academics cited, Daniels, supra, note 1, at para. 22, are P.W. Hogg,
Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed. Supp. (Toronto: Carswell, 2007, updated 2015, release 1) at
28-24 [hereinafter “Hogg, ‘Constitutional Law’”]; J.E. Magnet, “Who are the Aboriginal Peoples of
Canada?” in D.A. Dorey and J.E. Magnet, eds. Aboriginal Rights Litigation (Markham: LexisNexis
Butterworths, 2003) 23, at 44 [hereinafter “Magnet, ‘Who are the Aboriginal People of Canada?’”];
C. Chartier, “Indian”: An Analysis of the Term as Used in Section 91(24) of the British North
America Act, 1967” (1978-79), 43 Sask. L. Rev. 37 [hereinafter “Chartier, ‘Indian’”]; M. Stevenson,
“Section 91(24) and Canada’s Legislative Jurisdiction with Respect to the Métis” (2002) 1
Indigenous L.J. 237 [hereinafter “Stevenson, ‘Section 91(24)’”]; N. Lyon, “Constitutional Issues in
Native Law” in B.W. Morse, ed., Aboriginal Peoples and the Law: Indian, Métis and Inuit Rights in
Canada, rev. 1st ed. (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1989) 408, at 430 [hereinafter “Lyon,
‘Constitutional Issues in Native Law’”].
9
Daniels, supra, note 1, at para. 23.
10
Id., at para. 24. (The statute is An Act providing for the organization of the Department of
the Secretary of State of Canada, and for the management of Indian and Ordnance Lands, S.C.
1868, c.42.)
11
Daniels, id., at paras. 24 and 27.
12
Id., at para. 25.
13
Id., at paras. 28-30.
14
Id., at paras. 31-32.
15
Id., at para. 33.
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A consistent pattern starts to emerge that the exception is used to prove the
rule. There were certainly boundary issues where individual Métis were
included under statutory schemes, treaties or programs such as residential
schools but the general rule was that Métis were systematically excluded
from these activities. The general rule was that the Métis, in contrast to
Indians, were not part of the treaty process that spread west and north
across Canada, were not included under the Indian Act regime and were
generally excluded from such programs as residential schools. This is not to
say that there was no federal law governing the engagement between the
Métis and the Crown but that it followed a completely different trajectory.
These points can be understood by briefly looking at the eight classes of
evidence that were considered in the Daniels ruling.
1. Academic Opinion
There is certainly supportive material in the academic articles cited in
the decision, most particularly in the Chartier article,16 but on the whole the
articles tend to have a different focus than the intention of the framers in
1867. In fact, the Hogg, Magnet and Lyon pieces tend to focus on the
progressive interpretation of section 91(24).17 The Stevenson article offers
significant criticism of several evidentiary sources set out in the Chartier
article and relied upon in the Daniels judgment.18 There is no doubt that the
“prevailing view” has been that section 91(24) has a “wide compass” but it
would have been useful to see a closer examination of the various
arguments considered in the academic literature.19 This may have opened
up the possibility of an analytical separation between the meaning of the
term “Indians” in 1867 and its contemporary interpretation.
2. Quote from Thomas King
Justice Abella offered up this quote from Thomas King’s The
Inconvenient Indian:
No one really believed that there was only one Indian. No one ever said
there was only one Indian. But as North America began to experiment
16

Chartier, “Indian”, supra, note 8.
Hogg, “Constitutional Law”; Magnet, “Who are the Aboriginal People of Canada?”; and
Lyon, “Constitutional Issues in Native Law”, id.
18
Stevenson, “Section 91(24)”, id., at 251ff.
19
Daniels, supra, note 1, at para. 22.
17
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with its “Indian programs,” it did so with a “one size fits all” mindset.
Rather than see tribes as an arrangement of separate nation states in the
style of the Old World, North America imagined that Indians were
basically the same.20

Not much needs to be said about this quote as it does not advance
constitutional law argument one way or the other.21
3. 1868 Statute
A close examination of this statute does not support the inclusion of
the Métis within the category of Indians. The statute is a transitional
measure to ensure protection of lands formally set aside for bands of
Indians and does not expressly apply to Métis groups. It does have a
relatively open-ended definition of “Indian” that applies to individuals
with mixed blood, though they must be associated with a “tribe, band or
body” of Indians.22
4. Inclusion of the Métis in “many” post-Confederation Statutes
Among the statutes that are mentioned is an 1894 amendment to the
Indian Act dealing with the sale of liquor.23 An amendment to this statute
provided for the extension of the prohibition to any person “who follows
the Indian mode of life”. This provision, and others that use similar
language, are used to support the conclusion that a reference to Indians
would have been interpreted to include the Métis. It cannot be denied
that the application of these provisions included individuals who
undoubtedly identified as Métis but a close examination of the history of
this provision suggests that these cases were exceptions that were
contradicted by the general rule.
A vivid picture of the context of these provisions is painted by
Constance McIntosh in her study of the legal history of the phrase
“Indian mode of life”.24 She shows that the Statute was a continuation of
20
T. King, The Inconvenient Indian: A Curious Account of Native People in North America,
1st ed. (Toronto: Doubleday Canada, 2012) 83 cited at Daniels, id., at para. 23.
21
Daniels, id.
22
See Stevenson, “Section 91(24)”, supra, note 8, at 251ff.
23
Daniels, supra, note 1, at para. 27, referring to An Act to further amend “The Indian
Act”, S.C. 1894, c. 32.
24
C. McIntosh, “From Judging Culture to Taxing ‘Indians’: Tracing the Legal Discourse of the
‘Indian Mode of Life’” (2009) 47 Osgoode Hall L.J. 399-437 [hereinafter “McIntosh ‘Judging Culture’”].
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a practice that distinguished between “Indians” (who were perceived as in
need of protection) and the Métis (who were perceived as moving into the
mainstream and not in need of protection).25 There is no doubt that the
Statute was applied to individuals who might have been considered to be
Métis but the main thrust of the Statute was to distinguish between the two
groups. In other words, these statutory provisions were designed to police a
boundary that was defined by 19th century classifications based on race,
progress and civilization. McIntosh argues, that “This was a logical (if
racist) exercise to enable the state to determine whether individual “nontreaty Indians” were already assimilated into the industrial “way of life”. If
they were still like “Indians”, they would need to be subjected to the
restraints and protections of the assimilation apparatus.”26
A stark example of this brand of thinking is found in a statement from
Lieutenant Governor Alexander Morris in the context of the negotiation
of Treaty 3 with the Salteaux in 1873: “ …They must be either white or
Indian. If Indians, they get treaty money; if the Half-breeds call
themselves white, they get land.”27 Though these statutes support the
conclusion that there was some overlap between the categories of Indian
and Métis, they do not support the conclusion that Indians and Métis
were treated the same or that the Métis were considered a subset of the
category of Indians. Rather than being treated the same, Métis were
offered land on an individual basis, either under the terms of the
Manitoba Act or, further west, under federal statute.28 This land was
conveyed through “scrip” (a document which ostensibly could be
redeemed for land) and the administration of these land instruments led
to problems of implementation, speculation and delay that are explained
fully in the Manitoba Métis decision.29
5. Goal of Confederation
Some considerable weight is placed on the importance of the goal of
building a national railway as part of the Confederation project. It would
25

Id., at 406.
Id., at 409.
27
A. Morris, The Treaties of Canada with the Indians of Manitoba and the North West
Territories, Including the Negotiations on Which they Were Based and Other Information Relating
Thereto (Toronto: Belfords, Clarke & Co., 1880), at 69. See also McIntosh “Judging Culture”, id., at 415.
28
Manitoba Act, S.C. 1870, c. 3; An Act Respecting the Public Lands of the Dominion,
S.C. 1879, c. 23.
29
Manitoba Métis Federation Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2013] S.C.J. No. 14,
2013 SCC 14 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Manitoba Métis Federation”].
26
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be consistent with this goal to have as broad as possible a legislative power
to remove obstacles to its achievement, including a broad authority to deal
with Indigenous peoples. However, the historical record demonstrates
that the primary constitutional tool chosen to achieve this goal was the
retention of federal control over public lands on the Prairies well into the
20th century. Thomas Berger, speaking of John A. Macdonald, observes
that “...However, his journal records indicate that Macdonald and Cartier
insisted that they had to have a free hand to build the railway across
Manitoba; thus, public lands would have to be in federal ownership.”30
Indeed, federal policy instruments chosen to address Métis demands in the
19th century were oriented around the issuance of land scrip rather than the
negotiation of treaties. Until the enactment of the Natural Resources
Transfer Agreements in 1930,31 federal policy with respect to Indigenous
peoples, certainly with respect to land in the Prairies, was not dependent on
the breadth of section 91(24).32
6. Inclusion in Residential Schools
A key piece of evidence to support that the conclusion that Métis were
treated as Indians as federal policy is a quote from Indian Affairs
Minister Clifford Sifton from 1899 expressing the view that “…‘I am
decidedly of the opinion that all children, even those of mixed blood …
should be eligible for admission in the schools’”.33 However, to get
the full import of the quotation it is necessary to read it in full with the
inclusion of the words omitted in the ellipsis: “…I am decidedly of the
opinion that all children, even those of mixed blood, whether legitimate
or not, who live upon an Indian reserve and whose parents on either side
live as Indians upon a reserve, even if they are not annuitants, should be
eligible for admission to the schools.”34
30
T.R. Berger, QC, “The Manitoba Métis Decision and the Uses of History” (2015) 38:1
Man. L.J. 1-27, at 6; see also D. O’Toole, “Section 31 of the Manitoba Act, 1870: A Land Claim
Agreement” (2015) 37:1 Man. L.J. 73-117, at 105.
31
Supra, note 6. Separate schedules are set out for each of the four western provinces.
32
The argument is not that s. 91(24) played no role on the Prairies during the 19th and early
20th century, especially after the admission of the provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan and
Alberta, but rather that retention of control of public lands was the primary foundation for federal
policy with respect to both Indian and Métis claims.
33
Daniels, supra, note 1, at para. 28.
34
As cited in Canada, Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, Canada’s
Residential Schools: The Métis Experience: The Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission of Canada (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s Press, 2016) at 16 (emphasis added).
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The quote as presented is designed to support the view that Indian and
Métis individuals were treated in a similar fashion but the full quote
discloses a far more restricted practice.
7. Participation in Indian Treaties
There are certainly examples of Métis individuals and even
communities being included in the negotiation of several treaties.35
However, these examples are exceptions to the general rule that Métis
collectives were generally not included in the negotiation of either preor post-Confederation treaties. The primary evidence in support of
inclusion of Métis in the negotiation and administration of treaties is a
judicial report prepared by Mr. Justice W.A. Macdonald in 1944.36 This
report was prepared pursuant to an Inquiry established under section 18 of
the Indian Act.37 While the Report does confirm the continuation on
band lists of individuals who had been removed because they had
mixed blood, the bulk of the Report and the context under which it was
prepared are more consistent with the distinction that had been
historically made between Indians and the Métis. The Report is full of
the language of racial hierarchy that is so effectively portrayed by
Constance McIntosh.38 While the quotes that are reproduced in the
judgment tend to equate individuals with mixed blood and Indians, the
theme of the Report is more consistent with the historical pattern
of distinguishing between Métis and Indians. For example, in the
next paragraph after the passage quoted by Abella J., Macdonald J.
observes that:
It is well known that among the aboriginal inhabitants there were many
individuals of mixed blood who were not properly speaking
Halfbreeds. Persons of mixed blood who became identified with the
Indians, lived with them, spoke their language and followed their way
of life, were recognized as Indians. The fact that there was white blood
in their veins was no bar to their admission into the Indian bands
among whom they resided.39
35

See Stevenson, “Section 91(24)”, supra, note 8, at 254-57.
Report of Mr. Justice W.A. Macdonald Following an Enquiry Directed Under Section 18
of the Indian Act, August 7, 1944 [hereinafter “Macdonald Report”] (Daniels, supra, note 1, at paras.
31-32).
37
R.S.C. 1927, c. 98.
38
McIntosh, “Judging Culture”, supra, note 24.
39
Macdonald Report, supra, note 36, at 557.
36
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The basis for the refusal to remove mixed blood individuals from the
Band Rolls and from the Reserves was the long-standing presence of
these individuals within the Indian community:
It is a reasonable inference from the evidence that no striking change in
the condition of these people has taken place in the years that have
intervened since the treaty was signed. They are still fit subjects for the
paternal care of the Government.40

This report is a striking illustration of how far into the 20th century
the language of racial hierarchy and protection continued in public
discourse, but it is certainly not strong evidence for the simple equation
of Indians and Métis for constitutional purposes.
8. 1980 Paper on Constitutional Reform
Some weight is given to the opinions expressed in an internal federal
document that was prepared to aid preparation for negotiations about
constitutional reform.41 The unnamed author (or authors) of this report
expressed the view that Métis were included in the constitutional
category “Indians”. A little over a decade after the preparation of this
report a formal proposal was made to amend section 91(24) to clarify
that the Métis were included in the legislative authority of Parliament but
this proposal was not implemented because of the failure of a national
referendum.42 There are two problems with the reliance on this document
to support a conclusion about the original meaning of a constitutional
term. First, the Report appears to be silent as to whether the conclusion is
based on an assessment of the original meaning of section 91(24) or on
the modern or progressive interpretation of this provision.43 Second, and
more fundamentally, it appears risky to rely on internal advice tendered
to a party to litigation rather than the position that is adopted by that
party in court. In contrast, in the Patriation Reference, the Court was
much more reluctant to draw inferences from the contents of reports
prepared to aid constitutional negotiations.44
40

Id., at 559.
Daniels, supra, note 1, at para. 33.
42
Consensus Report on the Constitution, August 28, 1992 (popularly known as the
Charlottetown Accord). See especially sections 54, 55 and 56.
43
The tenor of the quotes offered tends to be that coverage under the Indian Act is not
required to be included under s. 91(24) but no constitutional analysis is provided.
44
Ref Re Amendment of Constitution of Canada, [1981] S.C.J. No. 58, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753
at 888ff., especially at 900 (S.C.C.).
41
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This article has not considered all of the evidence considered by
Abella J. to support the conclusion that federal practice tended to treat
Métis and Indians in a similar fashion. While there is certainly evidence
that tends to support this conclusion, a case can be made that the
evidence tends to refer to the exception rather than the rule. Indeed, when
some of the evidence is considered in the context of the time, clear
distinctions were made between the category Indian and Métis and these
distinctions tended to be mired in racial rhetoric about progress and
civilization.

II. THE LIVING TREE: ARGUMENTS FROM PROGRESSIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
In contrast, it is hard to criticize any element of the part of the ruling
dealing with progressive interpretation.45 The analysis is very brief and it
follows rather well-trodden paths of division of powers analysis. As was
the case in the Tsilhqot’in decision,46 the enactment of section 35 of the
Constitution Act, 1982, which recognized and affirmed the existing
Aboriginal and treaty rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada, is held to
be relevant to the interpretation of section 91(24) of the Constitution Act,
1867.47 It is difficult to disagree with the Court’s conclusion that it would
be anomalous to split jurisdiction over the three Aboriginal peoples of
Canada identified in section 35(2), particularly in light of the federal
concession that non-status Indians fell under the scope of section 91(24).
However, it would have been useful to explore more fully the parallels
between the constitutional issues raised in the two decisions. Tsilhqot’in
essentially concluded that section 35 provided a better constitutional tool
than the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine to resolve competing
Indigenous and government rights. Important questions remain about the
relationship between section 35 and section 91(24).48 While Tsilhqot’in
provides room for a large overlap in practice in the operation of federal,
provincial and Indigenous laws, the rights protected by section 35 remain
at the core of section 91(24). Earlier decisions had commented on the
inability of a province to alter or supplement Aboriginal or treaty rights,
45

Daniels, supra, note 1, at paras. 34-37.
Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2014] S.C.J. No. 44, 2014
SCC 44 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Tsilhqot’in”].
47
Daniels, supra, note 1, at para. 34.
48
Tsilhqot’in, supra, note 46, at para. 142.
46
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implying that such matters fall within the exclusive authority of
Parliament.49 While both federal and provincial orders of government can
infringe section 35 rights and present arguments to justify such
infringements, legislation that is directed at the rights regime itself seems
to be reserved to Parliament.50 These issues will undoubtedly be explored
as the jurisprudence develops, but Daniels does not advance our
understanding as much as it could have if the progressive interpretation
arguments had been the primary focus of the decision. That said, the four
paragraphs that cover progressive interpretation are quite rich and provide
an important foundation for deeper thinking about the modern project of
reconciliation and building a nation to nation relationship with Indigenous
peoples. However, Daniels would have provided a stronger foundation for
reconciliation if these four paragraphs formed the core of the ruling and
fleshed out some of the modern implications of the division of powers for
federal, provincial and Indigenous authority. It would also have been
helpful to have had a crisper analytical separation between the broadly
“originalist” and “progressive” components of the judgment.51

III. THE NEED TO RESOLVE INTERPRETIVE
DISCONNECTS IN DANIELS
Stepping away from the details of the ruling on the historic and
modern meaning of the term “Indians” and the inclusion of non-status
Indians within this category, it may be helpful to isolate some broader
characteristics of the ruling. Most notably, it reads very differently from a
standard division of powers decision. Rather than focusing on the
49
Paul v. British Columbia (Forest Appeals Commission), [2003] S.C.J. No. 34, 2003 SCC
55, especially at paras. 6, 19 and 29 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Paul”].
50
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abstract meaning of the wording of a constitutional provision, most
decisions look to particular pieces of legislation, the assignment of a
matter and the classification of that matter within federal and provincial
heads of power. In contrast, this decision looks to delineate an a priori
category of “Indians” who are external to the provision but who are
regulated by the provision. A key methodological choice is made in all
three levels of court in the Daniels case. Constitutional argument is
directed to determining the scope of a class of individuals who fall within
the category of “Indians”. Though the jurisprudence provides few
examples, a more traditional approach would be to assess the criteria that
are used by Parliament in reliance on the constitutional provision in
terms of whether those criteria are rationally related to the constitutional
provision. This is the approach that is used in the Canard decision, which
decides that federal regulation of Indian testamentary matters can be
upheld as a legitimate exercise of section 91(24):
The British North America Act, 1867, under the authority of which the
Canadian Bill of Rights was enacted, by using the word ‘Indians’ in
s. 91(24), creates a racial classification and refers to a racial group for
whom it contemplates the possibility of a special treatment. It does not
define the expression ‘Indian’. This Parliament can do within
constitutional limits by using criteria suited to this purpose but among
which it would not appear unreasonable to count marriage and filiation
and, unavoidably, intermarriages, in the light of either Indian customs
and values which, apparently were not proven in Lavell, or of
legislative history of which the Court could and did take cognizance.52

A key problem with this quotation is that section 91(24) is considered
to be a “race” power. While this characterization has occurred in other
more recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions,53 there is a strong case
to be made that jurisdiction over “Indians and Lands reserved for the
Indians” is not a race-based power but, in contrast, deals with legislation
in relation to Indigenous peoples who have rights based on prior
occupation and governance.54 However, if the reference to race is
disregarded in this quotation, it provides a sensible approach to the
division of powers. Rather than focusing on identifying the class of
individuals who fall within the category “Indians”, the focus is on the
52
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legitimacy of the criteria that may be used by Parliament in the exercise
of this power. These criteria can change over time and it is not
unreasonable that they will be more inclusive and respectful as our
understanding of rights and obligations develops. This is the essential
insight in the powerful first paragraph of Abella J.:
As the curtain opens wider and wider on the history of Canada’s
relationship with its Indigenous peoples, inequities are increasingly
revealed and remedies urgently sought. Many revelations have resulted
in good faith policy and legislative responses, but the list of
disadvantages remains robust. This case represents another chapter in
the pursuit of reconciliation and redress in that relationship.55

The paragraphs from the judgment which deal with the progressive
understanding of section 91(24) are fully consistent with the spirit of this
observation. However, the analysis of the historical record appears to
literally be caught in another era. It would be unfortunate if our
understanding of a constitutional provision was influenced by the
restricted and racially-based thinking of an earlier era.56 As a matter of
historical fact, Indians and Métis were not treated in precisely the same
fashion and the reasons for this are tied up with early views on the
appropriate treatment of Indigenous peoples. It is useful to recall the
purposes of section 91(24) as they are quoted in the judgment from
the Supreme Court of Canada:
Accordingly, the purposes of s. 91(24) were ‘to control Native people and
communities where necessary to facilitate development of the Dominion;
to honour the obligations to Natives that the Dominion inherited from
Britain ... [and] eventually to civilize and assimilate Native people’: para.
353. Since much of the North-Western Territory was occupied by Métis,
only a definition of “Indians” in s. 91(24) that included ‘a broad range
of people sharing a Native hereditary base’ (para. 566) would give
Parliament the necessary authority to pursue its agenda.57

It does seem quite problematic to have notions of “civilization” and
“assimilation” written into the hard-wiring of a constitutional provision. It
seems equally problematic that arguments about the historical meaning of
the provision are tethered to deeply contestable 19th century notions of
racial hierarchy and identity. This applies equally to arguments for why the
Métis are “in” section 91(24) as to arguments for why they are “out”.
55
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The problem is compounded when, as shown above, the arguments for the
inclusion of the Métis tend to transform exceptional examples into the norm.
One approach that might be recommended is to place dominant
reliance on the “progressive” parts of the ruling. The fundamental task
we now face is to develop our understanding of the role that legislation
places in the ongoing project of reconciliation. Cases such as Tsilhqot’in
have shown that there will be a complex interplay between the
recognition and affirmation of rights and the operation of division of
powers rules. Will there be any need to have recourse to the historical
understanding of the term “Indians”? One possibility, which seems
counter-intuitive, is a future action testing whether the Federal Crown
diligently implemented section 91(24).58 It seems counter-intuitive
because the purpose of a provision conferring authority under the
division of powers is to confer the legislative capacity to make choices.
The Federal Crown clearly made choices to generally treat Métis and
Indians differently but also to treat some Métis individuals the same way
as Indians. What would it mean to ask whether these choices amount to a
failure of diligent implementation? The better view is that section 91(24)
empowered choices to be made by Parliament. On the Prairies, a broader
range of choices was possible because of federal control of public lands.
It would seem exceedingly anomalous to second-guess these choices
from a division of powers perspective, especially as it has been
confirmed that there is no duty to legislate.59 It would be particularly
problematic to conduct such an assessment based on outdated 19th
century approaches to race and indigeneity.
It seems more appropriate to salvage the broad approach to section 91(24)
while downplaying attitudes of particular individuals about differentiation
between different classes of people. The practice of the time should be less
important than the question of whether section 91(24) inherently constrains
the authority of Parliament to enact legislation. There are several techniques
that can be used to support an interpretation of section 91(24) that is
flexible and capable of growth. For example, there are pre-Confederation
sources that speak more generally of British policy towards a broad
category of “aborigines”.60 It is not difficult, especially considering the
absence of explicit discussion during the Confederation debates on the
meaning of section 91(24), to see the reference to “Indians” as being
58
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coterminous with this broader category. This understanding would line up
with Abella J.’s initial observation about increasing sensitivity to human
rights concerns of this society over time. Even if the Métis, as a discrete
collective, were perceived to be fundamentally different from “Indians” at
an early stage of Canada’s history, room is left for the very concept of
indigeneity to grow and deepen over time.
A good source for exploring these issues might be the ongoing debate
that is occurring in the United States about different approaches to
originalism. Classical approaches to originalism tend to focus on the
views and practices of the framers. A revised approach to originalism,
commonly called “living originalism”, tends to focus on the semantic
meaning of terms in the written text of the Constitution rather than the
expected application of those terms at the time of enactment.61 This
approach also draws a distinction between interpretation and construction
of a constitutional provision and highlights the different constraining
force of constitutional rules, standards and principles. This approach
would be far less likely to be governed by how a provision was applied
in the past than whether the semantic meaning of the provision provides
a clear constraint on a constitutional power. When looked at from a
sufficiently high level of generality, the term “Indians” can clearly be
read in a fashion that does not disqualify revised approaches over time in
the legislative response to indigeneity.
To give an example of a useful line of inquiry inspired by the notion
of “living originalism”, Jack Balkin has observed that a term may have
been inserted in the Constitution as a kind of marker or shorthand for a
common law rule.62 In other words, when terms like “Indians” and
“Lands reserved for the Indians” were inserted into section 91(24), they
could be seen as a synoptic reference to incipient common law rules
about “native title” and the requirements of Imperial instruments such as
the Royal Proclamation of 1763. If so, it is not unreasonable for such
terms to have room to expand in response to developments in the
common law. Rather than focus on how words were used by actors at
the time, ascending to a different level of generality and considering the
61
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gradual development of common law norms dealing with Indigenous
issues, a strong case can be made that section 91(24) had an element of
flexibility enshrined in its original terms. Another benefit of this
approach to interpretation is that it is far less likely to privilege longrejected notions about assimilation and civilization. It is often noted that
the term “Indian” is very much a creation of European thought — there
were no Indians prior to the colonial encounter. Rather there were
separate and distinct Indigenous nations with highly diverse legal and
political systems. One of the likely consequences of deploying some of
the interpretative techniques of new originalist thinking is that the
distance between a progressive and an originalist interpretation of a
provision such as section 91(24) becomes smaller. We now know,
particularly after enactment of the 1982 reform package, that there is a
strong rationale for unitary legislative authority over a constitutionally
protected rights regime. A different approach to the constraining force of
the original constitution opens up possibilities for understanding a key
term like “Indians” in a different way and at a higher level of generality.
We would not have to understand constitutional authority in a manner
that is tethered to outdated notions of assimilation, civilization and
protection. An approach inspired by American scholarship on “new
originalism” may open up diverse and productive avenues for thinking
about both the scope and limits of section 91(24), especially as we move
into an era based on nation to nation relationships and self-determination.
We also know that the role of legislation has considerably changed in
the modern era of relations between governments and Indigenous
peoples. Many expenditure programs are managed under the spending
power. The centre of gravity is rapidly shifting towards Indigenous selfgovernment. Key tools for advancing equality of treatment, especially
section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,63 are not
strictly confined by the division of powers. Most importantly, the
dominant trend of division of powers jurisprudence has reflected
overlapping application of federal, provincial and Indigenous law rather
than watertight compartments. Seen from this angle, it becomes less
important to attempt to define the group of individuals who are “91(24)
Indians”. If it is simply accepted that the original provision is not overly
constraining so long as there is a rational connection to indigeneity, the
focus can shift to the reasonableness of the criteria that are used by
63
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Parliament to craft its legislative response and the appropriate balance
that is set between federal, provincial and Indigenous interests. These
may look rather different as the trend towards self-government becomes
further entrenched. It is becoming increasingly anomalous to think that
Parliament has the jurisdiction to define who may be considered an
Indigenous person. From this perspective, the most challenging aspect of
the Daniels decision may turn out to be the alteration of the three-part
Powley test (self-identification as Métis, an ancestral connection to an
historic Métis community and acceptance by a modern Métis community)
in the context of the division of powers.64 The abandonment of the
community acceptance criterion for the purposes of the division of
powers appears to be related to a concern about the rights of individuals
who are not accepted as part of the community. However, it is not
obvious that a federal legislative role is the only way to address these
concerns. Section 35, Charter equality rights and statutory human rights
codes may provide alternative remedies. It is too early to tell what
complications or questions will arise from defining the scope of Métis
for division of powers purposes in a broader fashion than the scope of
Métis as holders of section 35 rights.
The focus on individuals brought within section 91(24) also does not sit
well with the growing focus on collective rights and collective
governance.65 As Indigenous nations carve out space within Canadian
constitutionalism, assert room for their own legal systems and work out
relationships with other orders of government, an approach to the division
of powers that focusses on classes of individuals will be increasingly
anachronistic. It is true that an individual needs to know to which
government a claim can be presented,66 but this will naturally be harder to
envisage in a jurisdictional universe with interlocking legal systems and
overlapping laws. The very complexity of the post-Tsilhqot’in jurisdictional
environment, particularly when space is made for Indigenous legal systems,
64
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speaks strongly to the need for a more traditional approach to the division
of powers.67 Rather than attempting to further refine the abstract meaning of
the category of “Indians”, it would be strongly advisable to test particular
legislative initiatives in terms of the criteria that are used to forge the
necessary connection to indigeneity. Tools such as the aspect doctrine,
paramountcy and section 35 can be tailored to set the optimal balance
between federal, provincial and Indigenous law.
Similar care should be taken with respect to the task of giving meaning
to the references to constitutional “responsibility” in the Daniels
judgment.68 It no longer makes sense to speak of federal responsibility as if
it carved out an area that is immune from the influence of other
jurisdictions. It is particularly difficult to give operational meaning to the
term “responsibility” in light of the conclusion that there is no duty to
legislate.69 That is not to say that responsibility is not a major part of the
environment of Canadian Aboriginal law. But it is more sensible to turn to
section 35, especially the doctrine of the honour of the Crown, and the
obligations that flow from it such as fiduciary duty, duties to consult and
accommodate and duty to negotiate, to flesh out the nature of constitutional
responsibilities. There is certainly a place for Parliament to show leadership
through the enactment of legislation but such legislation will increasingly
differ from the Indian Act and similar legislation.

IV. CONCLUSION
The Daniels decision is a major landmark in Canadian constitutional
law. It resolves with finality a long-standing dispute about the
constitutional scope of section 91(24). We now know that Métis and nonstatus Indians fall within the scope of federal power. However, the
decision does not provide much guidance beyond this simple statement.
We are told that there is no constitutional obligation to enact legislation
though there are unspecified responsibilities that are in play. The tenor of
the judgment as a whole is to conceive of section 91(24) as being
characterized by externally defined collections of “Indians”, including
67
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the Métis and non-status Indians. But will this characterization ultimately
prove helpful in assessing future federal legislation? Ultimately, it is
likely that the question of what the legislation does will be far more
important than to whom it applies. There will certainly be no shortage of
questions that will emerge in the near future. This will include the
elaboration of section 35 rights held by Métis and non-status groups,
including Aboriginal title, the determination of who may legitimately
claim to represent the Métis and assertions of entitlements to programs
and services that are currently not available to Métis and non-status
Indians. Division of powers questions may arise with respect to existing
provincial legislation such as the Alberta Métis settlement legislation.70 If
we have learned anything over the last decade it is that the law of the
division of powers, section 35, equality rights and fiduciary law are
becoming increasingly intertwined. It is for this reason that this article
has suggested that primary weight should be accorded to the progressive
interpretation aspects of the decision. The parts of the judgment dealing
with historical interpretation and original intent raise difficult problems
and may not provide the same level of assistance in achieving
reconciliation between the Crown and all Indigenous groups within
section 91(24). It is particularly worrying that the historical analysis
inevitably relies upon evidence that is drenched with the racial
hierarchies of the 19th century. The focus has now decisively shifted to
the negotiation table, including bilateral discussions with the Métis
National Council, the Manitoba Métis Federation and other groups.
Much more needs to be done to work out the details of productive and
respectful relationships between the federal, provincial and Indigenous
orders of government. From time to time the parties will find it necessary
to turn to the courts to resolve disputes that have proven intractable.
While the Daniels decision lays out the overall map on the scope of
section 91(24), it may not prove productive to continue to attempt to
define the outer limits of the provision in an abstract way. It may be time
to turn back to the traditional methods of the division of powers that deal
with legislative proposals as they are enacted. The Daniels decision has
made an important contribution to the modern unfolding of a respectful
relationship between the Crown and all Indigenous peoples in Canada
but a different focus might be necessary in the future to support the kind
of negotiated outcomes that can achieve meaningful reconciliation.
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